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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
l'LLFTOX ~l. BOvVDEN, 
Rcspond('llf, 
-v:::;.-
Case No. 8054 
rrHE DEX\.El{ AKD RIO GRANDE 
\\'ESTERX RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Appella;nt. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE11ENT OF THE CASE 
Xumht>r~ in parenthesis refer to pages of the record. 
The partie:s will be referred to as in the Court below. 
Defendant's brief does not adequately present the 
faet~ to assure a proper consideration of the correctness 
of the trial court's order in granting plaintiff a new trial. 
In several instances defendant misstates the testimony. 
\\'e therefore feel it neee~sar~· to present the facts which 
an· material to the instructions questioned and to an 
understanding of the case. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a brakeman, 
and on the 21st day of December, 1951 was performing 
the duties of a head brakeman on an eastbound freight 
train from Salt Lake City to Helper, Utah (10, 15). 
At Soldier Summit, l~tah is located the summit of 
mountains over \vhich it was necessary to puH the train 
(118). From Soldier Summit to Helper is downgrade 
and in order to properly control the train it is necessary 
to set up what are known as retainers. These would be 
set up on about :35 .cars immediately behind the engine. 
It was plaintiff's duty to perform this task. Plaintiff's 
train arrived at Soldier Summit in the early morning 
hours. It was dark. Another eastbound train was to pass 
the freight train. To accon1plish this it was necessary 
to run the freight train into a passing track at Soldier 
Sununit (1-!). Plaintiff \vould have to get out of the en-
gine cab, where he was riding, and set up each of the 35 
retainers. To save delay he started to climb down the 
gang,vay ladder on the south side so that as soon as the 
stop was made he could get off (15). As he stepped 
on the second step from the bottmn his right leg, about 
half way between the ankle and knee, was caught by snow 
alongside the 'track ( 17). The engine was going between 
-± and 5 miles an hour (18). As he stood on this ladder 
he was unable to see beyond the head end of the engine 
and could only see flying snow and steam (38, 63). The 
snow swept his feet from the ladder and he was dragged 
along for some little distance as he clung to the ladder. 
He was finally forced to lelt go (18). In describing the 
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~nowbank, which had been responsible for his fall, plain-
tiff te~tified (20) : 
"Q. K ow, as you \\·ere going back along 
there, did you 111ake any observation of the con-
dition of the snow along the side of the track'? 
"~-\.. Ye8, I did; I looked at the snowbank 
Yery closely. 
"Q. Describe to the jury what you saw there, 
please. 
"A. \Yell, 1ny estimate of the snow was from 
three to four feet high, with a straight surface 
bank on it, which was right up ag'in the cars: 
couldn't get between it and the car. I walked on 
top of the snowbank, and was coming back, putting 
up retainers both \Ya ys. 
"Q. Keep your voice up. 
''~\. \Yell, snow was very solid and hadn't-
wasn't no ten1porary snow there; been there for 
several days in the way it was solid. 
· 'Q. Did it look like it was drifting, also t 
"A. No, it didn't. 
"Q. \Vere there any marks on it ~Ton could 
tell? 
''A. Yes, there was some marks in the bank 
of it. 
''Q. \Vhat kind of 1narks ~ 
"A. \Vell, which showed the side of the en-
gine, or different parts of the engine was drag-
ging. 
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"Q. Was what~ 
"A. Drug the bank, yes. 
"Q. You walked back the 35 cars, then walk-
ed forward fixing the retainers~ 
''A. Yes." 
.\:-; l'ar as plaintiff kn<·w, the tracks there were clear 
and he presumed that there was no close clearance and 
he relied upon that pr<>~lllll)Jtion (37, 70). The conductor 
t<'~t i l'ie<l that he would not expect an impairment of clear-
::uw<> to a man standing on the ladder of an engine in the 
position of plaintiff ( R. 87). 
The defendant operated snowplows for the purpose 
of clearing 1the tracks at Soldier Summit. One of the 
purpo:-es of clearing the snow away from the tracks ,,·as 
to make sufficient clearance for men to ride on the side 
of the cars, and it was known that men worked along the 
south side of this passing track (124). While cleaning the 
track of snow it is necessary to pull in the wings of the 
plow to avoid some obstructions along the side of the 
track. In this particular case there was a battery box 
close enough to the track so as to require a pulling in 
of the wings (78, 81, 1:21, 1:23). 
It was necessary to clean around switch stands and 
battery boxes with a bulldozer in order to afford suffi-
cient clearance for men working on the trains (122, 123). 
The defendant knew that by pulling in the wings an area 
would be left where there would be insufficient clear-
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ance to pennit 1nen to work on the trains with safety 
( 1 :2-t, 1:23). In sending the train through this passing 
track no warning· was given to the n1en on the train that 
they could expect close clearance ( 128). As n1atter of 
fact, it was not necessary to send the train down into 
this area without giving a warning or until the snow had 
been safely cleared to permit the men to work in safety 
(125 ). 
Defendant's Roadmaster, W. R. Thomson, was in 
charge of the work of cleaning snow from the tracks at 
Soldier Sunm1it (114, 115). 
There was no evidence that snow crews were work-
ing on the tracks at the time plaintiff was injured and no 
evidence that the bank of snow, responsible for plaintiff's 
injuries, was drifted snow. 
The case was submitted to the jury upon the erron-
eous instructions and a verdict of "No Cause of Action" 
resulted. 
STATE~Il£1\T OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
1. 11/ aster is charged with knowledge of conditions 
e.1~isting at place where he sends his servants to work 
a11d sen·a.nt is not required to prove knowledge of ~tnsafe 
condition. 
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:2. 111 aster i~ charged as matter of law with knowl-
edge acquired by his servants and with knowledge of un-
safe condition created by his servants. 
:L Where defendant is charged with knowledge as 
muller of law, to instruct jury it must find existence of 
knmdedge before it can find liability constitutes pre-
.i uri icinl error. 
-1. The giving of subdhision (2) of Instruction No. 
9 conslifllfed prejndicial error. 
G. Contentions and authorities of defendant an-
su·e rl'd and a nul !J zed. 
POIKT II. 
THE TRIAL .COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10. 
ARGF:JIENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
One of the grounds upon which plaintiff sought re-
co,Tery was that defendant failed to exercise reasonable 
care to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. 
Plaintiff requested an instruction on this subject, 
which the court in substance gave as its Instruction No. 6 
(207) : 
"If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant failed to use reasonable 
care to furnish plaintiff a safe place to work in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
that the defendant in clearing the ~now from it~ 
tracks at Soldier\; Stumnit failed to elean the 
tracks a sufficient distance to permit persons law-
fully riding on the side of engines or cars to do so 
in safety and without coming in contact wi1th the 
snow, then you are instructed that the defendant 
was negligent, and if you shall further find that 
such negligence proximately caused, in whole or in 
part, injuries to plaintiff, then you should return 
a verdict in fayor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant and award to plaintiff darnages as 
in these instructions set forth." 
r nder this instruction the jury, to return a verdict 
for plaintiff, was required to find that defendant in 
clearing snow frmn its tracks failed to clear the tracks 
a sufficient distance to permit persons riding on the 
~ides of engines to do so \vith safety and without coming 
in contact with the snow, and that such conduct was a 
failure to use reasonable care in furnishing to plaintiff 
a reasonably safe place to work. This is all a servant 
need prove in order to establish the liability of a master 
upon this ground. 
At defendant's request, the trial court gave a further 
instruction upon this subject as its Instruction No. 9, 
which is set out at length on page 4 of the Brief of Ap-
pellant. Under that instruc'tion before the railroad could 
be found negligent in failing to provide a safe place to 
work, the jury must find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the railroad knew, or by the exercise of rea-
sonable care should have known, that there was snow 
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or otlH•r substance near the track at the point of the acci-
dPnt. This added an element with which defendant was 
<'lla rg(~d as matter of law and no jury finding was neces-
~ary thereon. 
Under B11b /j, Union l)ucijic R. Co., (Utah), 233 P. 
:2d :~:~:2, a nwst(•J' is charged with knowledge of conditions 
Pxi:-ding in places where it sends its servants to work. 
.\ bo in this case the unsafe condition was created by 
defendant'~ servants, including a roadmaster, and these 
;-;erynnts had knowledge of the existence of the snowbank. 
Ilen(·p, defendant was charged as matter of law with 
knowledge of conditions there existing. 
1. Jla.stcr is charged zcith knowledge of conditions 
c.ristin_q at place zdzere he sends his servants to work 
aJid serumt is not required to prot·e knowledge of wnsafe 
couditioll. 
In the last dozen years the Supreme Courrt of the 
l ~ nited States has given a liberal construction to the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act and has been very careful 
to see that railroad workers are afforded protection un-
der that Act. One of the cases within this period wherein 
the court addresses itself to the proposition of a safe 
place to work is Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 
350, 352, 353, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 1063, 87 L. Ed. 1444. In set-
ting forth the principles involved in this very important 
duty of a master, the court stated: 
"Sec. 1 of the Act makes the carrier liablP 
in damages for any injury or death 'resulting 
in whole or in part from the negligence' of any of 
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whirh the Act ereates are federal rights protected 
bY federal rather than local rules of law·. * * * 
~-\nd those federal rules have been largely fashion-
ed fr01n the conunon law * * * except as Congress 
has written into the 4.\et different standards. * * "' 
~lt conunon law the duty of the employer to use 
reasonable care in furnishing his employees with 
a safe place to work was plain. * * * As stated by 
this Court in the Patton case it is a duty whirh 
bec01nes "more in1perative' as the risk increases. 
'Reasonable care becon1es, then, a den1and of high-
er supremary, and yet, in all cases it is a question 
of the reasonableness of the care, reasonableness 
depending upon the danger attending the place or 
the Inachinery.' * * * It is that rule which ob-
tains under the E1nployers' Liability Act. * * * 
That duty of the carrier is a 'continuing one' * * * 
from which the carrier, is not relieved by the fact 
that the en1ployee's work at the place in question 
is fleeting or infrequent." 
The court cited and relied upon the earlier case of 
Kreiglz L Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co., 214 U.S. 
249, 29 S. Ct. 619, 621, 622, 53 L. Ed. 984. The court in 
that case in describing this duty, stated: 
"The duty of the master to use reasonable 
diligence in providing a safe place for the men in 
his e1nploy to work in and to carry on the business 
of the Inaster for which they are engaged has been 
so frequently applied in this court, and is now so 
thoroughly settled, as to require but little refer-
ence to the cases in whirh the doctrine has been 
declared. 
* * * 
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"Nevertheless, the duty of providing a reason-
ably safe place for the carrying on of the work 
is a continuing one, and is discharged only when 
the master furnishes and maintains a place of 
that character. As late as Santa Fe & P. R. Co. 
v. Holmes, 202 U. S. 438, 50 L. ed. 1094, 26 Sup. 
(it. Rep. 676, it was declared: 'The duty is a con-
tinuing one and must he exercised whenever cir-
<'umstances demand it.'" 
That dm;e <'learance constitutt-~ an unsafe place to 
work i:-: estahli8hed by the case of Ellis 1.:. Union Pac. R. 
( 'o., :t2!) l T .S. (i-J.!), (jj S. ('t. 3!)--<, :J!)!), 91 L. Ed. 372, where-
in the ('Ourt :-:tates: 
"'* * * The nearness of the track to the build-
ing created an unsafe place for work." 
ln none of the foregoing cases is there any require-
ment that the jury find the master had knowledge of the 
dangerous condition of the premises in or onto which the 
master sent his servant to perform work. A moments re-
flection will give the underlying reason. A master under-
takes to send his servant into a certain place to work. 
The master should determine and 1nake inquiry about 
the conditions there in existence. If there is a danger-
ous condition existing it would be his duty to eliminate 
such condition, warn the servant of its existence, or re-
fuse to permit the servant to go into the area. There is 
no reason why a master should be able to say that he 
was not aware of a dangerous condition existing in a 
place where he has sent his servant to perform a task 
which would be financially beneficial to the master. 
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Thi~ is nwre clearly true in the ease at bar than in 
the ordinary ea~e. Here wa~ an obvious danger, a danger 
created by serYant~ of the defendant in clearing snow 
from the tracks and leaYing a bank of snow too rlose to 
the tracks for safety. 
~-\t one time it may be that the courts required a 
finding of either actual or constructive knowledge of 
dangerous conditions. \Ye submit that is no longer the 
law. This change is recognized in a recent article found 
at 1:2 F.R.D. 13, entitled Federal Employers' Liability 
..:\d, and written by B. Nathaniel Richter and Lois G. 
Forer. At page 30 the authors state: 
··* * * Nevertheless, under the F.E.L.A., the 
unsafe condition of the car, locomotive, track, 
roadbed or prernises may give rise to liability if 
the jur·y infers that such unsafe conditions caused 
the injuries con1plained of. Older cases required 
notice by the carrier of the unsafe condition, be-
fore allowing the jury to find negligence. 
"The duty to maintain a safe place is non-
delegable and the carrier is responsible for any 
injuries resulting therefrom even though it had 
no control over the premises. The Supreme Court 
has recently held that the unsafe conditions are of 
themselves evidence of negligence and permit the 
case to go to the jury if causation might be infer-
red.'' 
This Court has recognized that change in the recent 
<'H~e of B1d.z r. Uniou Pacific R. Co. (Utah), 233 P. 2d 
3:t~. In that case plaintiff was mnployed by defendant 
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a~ a :-~\\'itdnnan and was riding the lead end of a cut of 
<·ar:-~ being- :-~llove<l l1y defendant on the tracks of the 
Dt>nver Union r_rerminal Cmupan~', at Denver, Colorado. 
I ~:l~g-ag<' trucks w<~re too close to the tracks to permit 
a lllan to ride in ~afety on the side of the car in the posi-
t ion ol' plaintiff. He was ~hoY<·d into these baggage 
tnwk:-~ and n•(·<~iv<~<l injury. In ~tating the problem, this 
( ~ourt :-:tat<·d (p. :~:~:n: 
"As will hereinafter appear, the difficult 
que:-:tion in this case is not whether the plaintiff 
was furnished a safe place in which to work, but 
whether defendant railroad should be held re-
sponsible for the conditions at the place of plain-
tiff's injury and the fact that the baggage trucks 
were 1nisplaced too close to the tracks where plain-
tiff was required to perform his duties at the time 
he got hurt." 
The Court directly held that in the situation of the 
!J 11 t z case defendant was charged with knowledge of the 
physical conditions existing in a place to which defendant 
sent its employees. The Court stated (p. 335): 
"Defendant maintains that there is no basis 
for either its actual or constructive knowledge of 
the condition of danger which existed here. The 
defendant is charged with knowledge of the phy-
sical conditions there existing including the tracks, 
platform, the baggage trucks and the method of 
their use and operation." 
In addressing itself to the role of the employer in 
these cases the Court also stated (p. 336): 
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· ·* * * The en1ployer exPrci::::;e::::; exclusive choiee 
both as to the place of work and control over 
safetv factors. It is therefore not unreasonable 
to ch~u·ge hin1 with the duty of providing a safe 
place to work'' 
This case ::::;tands for the proposition that under the 
Federal Employers' Liability ~\et a servant is not re-
quired to prove that the carrier had actual or construc-
tive notice of an unsafe condition at the place he is in-
jured, and the presumption is that the carrier has notice 
since it controls places of work and the assign1nents 
which the employee n1ust carry out. 
The proof necessary to establish a safe place to work 
<·ase is f'et forth as follows (p. 336) : 
"This history, together \Yith the language 
of the adjudicated cases, including the \Vilkerson 
case itself, point to one inescapable conclusion: 
The Supreme Court of the United States says 
with unequivocal certainty that wherever a rail-
road employee under F.E.L.A. is injured in the 
course of duty and there is any evidentiary basis 
upon which reasonable minds could believe that 
reasonable care Inight have required additional 
safety measures which were not taken, and which 
contributed in whole or in part to cause the in-
jury, the case should be tried to a jury." 
There is no requirement here of knowledge. There 
was no testimony of any kind in the Butz case tending to 
~how that defendant had any knowledge of the position 
of the haggage trucks. This court of necessity held knowl-
edge was not a required part of plaintiff's case. 
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Tit<·re are two propositions present in the case at 
hur, not pres<'n t in the JJ Ill.?, case, which rnake the case 
at har even a stronger case for plaintiff. In the Butz 
<·a:-;(' tltP t•tnploye(~ was sent to property of another and the 
emplo~·er was still charged with the responsibility of its 
<·ond i tion, whi I(' in the C'ase at bar the property upon 
\\'hich plaintiff \\'as injured was the property of defend-
ant <·:.uri<·r. ..:\!so, in the lJ !liz case there could be no way 
of determining who placed the baggage trucks too close 
to the traeks and it was assumed the trucks were left by 
T<~nllinal Company employees. In the case at bar the 
dose clearance could only have been treated l>y servants 
of the defendant. 
~Pl' also: Tr:rminal R. A.<;.<;'n. of St. Louis v. Fitz-
jolw, Hij F. 2d 41~~ (8 CCA); Shiffler 1:. Pennsylvania R. 
( :o.J 1/(i F. :2d 368 (3 CCA); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. 
Ry. ( 'o. r. Gill, :217 F. :Zd 195 (5 CCA); Chicago, Rock Is-
land & Poe. Ry. Co. c. I(ifer, 216 F. 2d 753 (10 CCA); 
Trillium,) r Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 190 F. 2d 7-±-! (5 
(_'(_'~-\). 
In Sllifj'ler c. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, a directed 
verdict for defendant was reversed although the court 
disregarded eYidence of notice to the cornpany of the 
conditions alleged to render the place of work unsafe. 
In Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kifer, 
supra, the plaintiff's ~ction was under Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act and he sought recovery on the principle 
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of failure to furnish a ~afe place to work. rrhe fact~ are 
ahnost identieal with the Bntz case and a verdict for 
plaintiff \Yas affinned. There was no proof of knowledp;P. 
\Ye submit that under the foregoing authorities de-
fendant \Yas charged \Yith knowledge of conditions exist-
ing at ~oldier Sununit. 4\s will hereinafter appear, it 
was prejudicial error to permit the jun· to speculate 
upon ·whether or not defendant had such knowledge. 
:2. Jlaster is charged as mattr:r of laze 1rith kn01rl-
edge acqnired by his sen·ants and n·ith knowledge of tm-
safe condition crPated by his sen.·ants. 
The defendant's roadmaster was in charge of the 
,,·ork of cleaning snow from the tracks at Soldier Summit 
(11-!, 113), and he knew that it was necessary to clean 
around the switch stands and battery boxes with the bull-
dozer in order to afford sufficient clearance for 1nen 
working on the trains (122, 123). He also knew that by 
pulling in the ,,·ings of the snow plows an area would be 
left where there would be insufficient clearance to permit 
men to work on the trains with safety ( 124, 125). He 
testified that one of the purposes of clearing the tracks 
in this area was to make sufficient clearance for men to 
work along the sides of trains ( 124). The testimony of 
plaintiff is the only testimony concerning the type of 
snow which drug hin1 from the engine. His testimony is 
~d out in detail under the Statement of Facts. Suffice it 
to say here he testified the snow appeared to have been 
there for several days and it was not drifted snow. 
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\\' e hen· lmYe conclusive and positive evidence that 
the em plo~·t·t~s of defendant, under the supervision of its 
Hoadmastt·r rehmm;on, created the close clearance by pull-
ing- in t Itt~ wings of the snow plow and not clearing it a 
~nfl'ieiPnt distan<~t~ for the safety of Inen riding the sides 
()I' trains. Tit<' ca~e~ clearly hold that a master is charged 
with tlw knowledge of his servants. lt seems almost trite 
to ~ay it is only through servants that this defendant 
railroad ('orporation could acquire knowledge of condi-
tions at ~oldier ~ummit on this particular occasion. The 
roadmaster knew of the conditions existing at Soldier 
~ummit, and under the authorities this is the knowledge 
of d('fendant. Field L·. Xortltu·est Steel Co., 67 Or. 126, 
1 :r> Pac. 320; Rogers v. Portland Lmnuer Co., 54 Or. 387, 
103 Pac. 51-!; ,'-iclierer 'li. Danziger, 178 Cal. 253,173 Pac. 
~.->;Hennig r. Car~tens Packing Co., 136 Or. 267,297 Pac. 
1055; Juck~u11 c. Yak Jfining, Jlilling & Tunnel Co., 51 
Colo. ;).) 1, 119 Pac. 1058. 
r:rhe close clearance existing at Soldier Summit was 
created by defendant. This being so, it is charged with 
knowledge of the condition. 
In Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oliphant, 172 Old. 
635, 45 P. 2d 1077, 1081, the deceased was an electrician 
who 'vas sent to repair a light switch. He climbed a pole 
and was electrocuted. Plaintiff introduced testimony 
that the electrical syste1n at that point was i1nproperly 
constructed. In holding defendant charged with knowl-
edge of the condition of this systen1 the court stated: 
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.. \\~here the mnployer is guilty of negligence 
a~ a matter of law in creating a dangerous situa-
tion, knowledge of the existence of such situation 
is in1puted to hin1 and it is his duty to notify his 
en1ployee of such dangerous situation. 'It is the 
dutY of the n1aster to \Yarn his employees of dan-
ger~ arising out of the progress of the work which 
are known to hin1 and unknown to them, and this 
is a nondelegable duty.' Thurlow et al. v. Failing 
et al., 133 Okl. 277, 272 P. 368, 37~. And, under 
such circumstances, \Ve see no reason why the 
degree of skill possessed by the employee should 
haYe any bearing on the question, in the absence 
of notice." 
\Ye submit defendant \\·as charged with the knowl-
edge of it~ roadmaster and other e1nployees in the area, 
and if the clearance \vas close enough to catch a person on 
the side of the engine, it was charged with knowledge of 
that condition through its servants. 
3. Where defendant is charged with knowledge as 
matter of lazr, to instruct jury it must fimd existence of 
knozcledge before it can find liability constitutes pre-
judicial error. 
The giving of this instruction added materially to the 
burden of plaintiff and tended to confuse the jury. The 
instruction sub1nitted by plaintiff made no such require-
ment. It provided that before plaintiff could recover the 
jury must find defendant created an unsafe condition. 
In addition to the defendant creating an unsafe condition 
it was necessary under this added instruction to find 
that defendant had knowledge of the condition. This cer-
tainly was error. 
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ln /1J'll'!JUlllt l:. ~<,'Lwulard Coal Co., 50 utah G8:J, 168 
Pa<'. 2(i(i, 2(i7, all action was brought for the death of a 
miiiPI'. Tl1P <·vidence was undisputed that explosive gas 
had been found in the mine more than two months before 
the fatality. rrhe court instructed that it was a mine 
known to generate such gas. This instruction was correct 
al1<l tl}(· <·ou rt held that a trial court should not leave an 
undisput<'d fad to 1Je determined by the jury, and stated: 
"• • • The fact that explosive gas was found 
in the mine was therefore an undisputed question, 
and, that being so, no finding to the contrary could 
have been truthfully wade by the jury. vVhere a 
finding with respect to any essential fact must 
Jwtessarily be in the affirmative, it is ordinarily 
the duty of the court to declare the fact, and not 
permit the jury to assume that they may find the 
fact contrary to the undisputed evidence." 
In TlwntJJSOJI [~nion Fi::;llrrman's Co-Op Packing Co., 
1 lS Or. -t:~(i, :233 Par. 695, an action ·was brought to re-
eovt'r for the death of plaintiff's daughter. She was em-
ployed b~- defendant and was killed while on an elevator 
defendant had left in charge of a minor. The jury was 
instructed that defendant could not be liable if deceased 
\Yas in the elevator and attempted to operate it without 
the knowledge of agents of defendant. This instruction 
was held prejudicial error because the deceased daughter 
was on the elevator at tl1e invitation of the minor, and 
defendant was of necessity charged with the knowledge 
its servant had acquired. 
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\Ye ~ubmit that the gtYmg of thi~ instruction was 
prejudicial error. 
±. The giring of Sltbdirisioll (.2) of Instruction No . 
. 9 co nsf it uted prejudicial error. 
Before plaintiff could recover subdivision (:2) of this 
in~trnction required that the jury find (1) defendant had 
a rca~onablv sufficient tirne to elin1inate the snow, ( 2) 
eould reasonably have eli1ninated it, and ( 3) defendant 
failed to do it. 
Here again \Ye have defendant's request piling ele-
ment upon ele1nent, thereby increasing without end the 
hurden placed upon plaintiff. 
The jury could find that defendant did not have 
time to eliminate the snow before plaintiff's train went 
through the pn~~ing track hut because of the unsafe con-
dition of the area reasonable care had not been exercised 
to furnish a reasonably safe place to work. Defendant 
did not need to send its train into this area at the precise 
moment which it did. It could have waited until the area 
had been made safe and in failing to do this it was negli-
gent. 
The trial court set forth three necessary factors to 
find under the subdivision. The first and second are the 
~ame, though \\·orded differently. The trial court follow-
ing· defendant's request required both. \Vhy~ This was 
error and confusing to the jury. 
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\\' e ~ub111it that subdivision (2) of this instruction 
wa~ erroneou~ and giving it to the jury was prejudicial. 
5. Contentions and a11thorities of defendant an-
su:ererl and auuly.zed. 
On page 10 of its brief defendant asserts the jury 
mHloul)tt·dly found plaintiff's foot encountered "newly 
dri l'h·d ~now that had accumulated during the early 
morning hours along the side of the track." There is no 
eYi(1Pil('(' to support any such finding. The only evidence 
relating to the ~mowbank ~was that of plaintiff and there 
wa~ no eviden<·e any drifted snow caught plaintiff. 
Defendant C'untend:s the jury could very reasonably 
have found defendant did not know of the existence of an 
alleged close e learance and had no reasonable opportunity 
to correct this condition. It contends the close clearance 
C'Ould ha,~e been created by drifted sno\v. It contends 
this was its theory. 
The difficulty ,,·ith defendant's contentions above 
outlined is that the instruction is not limited to drifted 
snow close clearance. The instruction states unequivo-
cally that in order for plaintiff to recover under any or 
all conditions the jury must find as one of the elements 
that defendant had actual constructive knowledge of the 
elose clearance. This is not true if that close clearance 
were created by defendant through its servants by pull-
ing in the wings of the snowplow and leaving the snow-
bank too close to the engine for an en1ployee to ride safely 
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on its ::;ide. This instruction created such a confusion 
when eompared with Instruction No. 9 that a new trial 
must be giYen so that a jury may be clearly and correctly 
instructed on this Yery Yital subject. 
The authorities cited by defendant, with the excep-
tion of the Butz case, supra, are not helpful. 
In O'J[ara r. PeHnsylnwia R. Co., 95 F. 2d 762 (6 
CC~-\), plaintiff had charge of a railroad station and 
jumped frmn baggage trucks to the platfonn lighting on 
a :-:quare headed bolt. The station platfonn \Yas between 
t\\·o :-:treeb and served as a sidewalk for the public. How 
long the bolt had been there and by whom it had been 
placed could not be detern1ined from the evidence. The 
eonrt express!~· distinguished the situation there pre-
sented from one where the accident occurred upon com-
pany property and to which only employees of defendant 
\\·ould have access. This latter situation is the one pre-
~ented in the case at bar. 
Hatton v. N eu.: York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 261 Fed. 667 
(1 CCA) was decided in 1919, and does not follow the 
rule of the later cases. In that case ice on a station plat-
form caused a plank to slip. There was no evidence that 
an~· agents of the defendant had knowledge of its ex-
istence. In the case at bar there was undisputed evidence 
that defendant had knowledge of the snow and of the fact 
that close clearance was left by pulling in the wings of 
the :-;nowplow. 
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Southern l(tJ. Co. v. Sleu.·u/rt, 11;') F. 2d 317 (8 8C~\), 
involv<>d an <>ntirely different situation. 1,hen~ the arm 
of the d<><·<>a~<>d pen; on was crushed bet \veen two coup-
ler~. Tlw injurieH were fatal. The jury was instructed 
tit a 1 in the ah~Pll<'<· of evidence that deceased did not 
w.;e the pin lifter mechanism on the coupler the law 
prP~Illll<'d lH· did use it before going between the ends 
ol' tl1<· <·:u::;. This instruction was held error. The case 
i~ not even r<·Jttotely helpful here. 
In ,'-,'cliil/i;tg c. /Jelazrare and H. R. Corp., 114 F. 2d 
(i~l ( ~ CCA), plaintiff brakeman caught his foot in ties 
and a car ran over his leg. The ties were two rails 
welded together. Ordinarily the space between these 
rai b was filled with cinder~, but in this particular case 
there were no cinders there. The court held that defen-
dant'~ only duty was adequate inspection and timely 
repair. This is distinguished from the ca~e at bar in that 
here the condition ·was created Ly the activities of defen-
dant, while in the Sclzilliug case it \\·as not. Also, there 
the court fails to give effect to the repeal of the fello-w 
seiTant doctrine and held that knowledge of the train-
men who did not do track n1aintenance work was not 
equivalent to notice to defendant. In the case at bar, 
the roadmaster and employees under his supervision, 
\dlO would have knowledge of this condition at Soldier 
Summit, were engaged in track 1naintenance work. A 
recent case directl~- contrary to this case is Chicago, 
Rock Island and Pac. R. Co. v. Gill, 217 F. 2d 195; Saun-
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dcr:-: r. Longricw, P. & X. Ry. Co .. 1 ()1 'Yn~h. :280, :2!)() 
Pac. ~;~:), wn~ decided in 1931, and ·was based upon the 
proposition that the plaintiff assumed the risk, a doc-
trine long since discarded by the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10. 
Another ground upon ·which plaintiff sought re-
('nn~r~~ was the negligent failure of defendant to ·warn 
plaintiff of the insufficient clearance between the cars 
or engine and the snowbank. At plaintiff's request, the 
eonrt instructed the jun~ on this subject in the second 
paragraph of it~ Instruction No.7 (208): 
··If you shall find frmn a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant failed to warn 
plaintiff that there was insufficient clearance 
between the cars or engine and the snowbank at 
the side of the tracks at Soldier's Sum1nit, and 
that such failure constituted negligence, and that 
~uch negligence proximately caused, in whole 
or in part, injuries to plaintiff, then you should 
return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant.'' 
All of the ele1nents required are set forth in this 
paragraph of the instruction. The court in giving In-
:-;tnwtion K o. 10, set forth at length on pages 4 and 5 
the Brief of Appellant, adds a new and additional ele-
ment necessary for plaintiff to establish in order to 
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l'l'<'<)\'Pl'. ~uhdivi~ion (2) of this instruction requires 
that thP .iury find the railroad knew, or by the exercise 
ol' n·a~ona\,\(• <'HI'(· should have known, of the insufficient 
<·l<·aratw<· aud ~hould reasonably have known that it 
(·n·at<'d an appn·<·ial>l(~ ri:-;k of harm to railroad work-
PI':-:. A1·<·ordiug t<, tlH~ authorities cited under Subdivi-
:-;1<,11 ( :!) of l'oi11t J, det'(·ndant was charged as matter 
of luw with kllO\\ l<·d_:!·<· acquired by its servants. Its 
l't-1"\'allt:- \\'(Jrl.:ing in the area and clearing the tracks of 
:-;How wuulJ <Jf n<·tt·;-;:-:ity know about close clearance left 
by the111. ln ~ ~'-J'/1 ,.a f111a" u uri Redfield on }..' egligence 
( Ht·\·. Ed.) }J .• -J:.!, ~l'<·. :.!1\ the rule applicable to this 
point i:-: stated a~ folio,,·:': 
,. It is the duty of the n1aster to use reason-
able care to provide for the servant, so far as 
the work at which he is engaged will permit, 
a reasonable safe and proper place in which to 
do his work, and to that end, if the place may 
become dangerous by reason of perils arising 
fr01n the doing of other work pertaining to the 
master's business, different from that in which 
the particular servant is engaged, to give him 
such warning of the additional dangers as will 
enable him, in the exercise of reasonable care, to 
avoid them, or to guard himself against them.'' 
Subdivision (2) of Instruction No. 10 requires 
plaintiff to prove not only that plaintiff knew there was 
insufficient clearance, but also that it "should reason-
ahl~· have known that it created an appreciable risk of 
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hann to railroad workers." No jury finding should be 
required on this proposition. The evidence wa~ uncon-
tradicted that defendant\; ~l'lTants engaged in cleaning 
snO\Y knew that trai1unen would use the south side of 
the ea~tbonnd passing track ( 1:2i~, 124) and that one of 
the purposes of making sufficient clearance was to per-
mit trainmen to work along the south side in safety 
(1~-l:). It follo\\·s that if there was insufficient clearance 
then there \Ya~ appreciable risk of harn1 to railroad 
workers and no jury finding was necessary on this 
latter proposition. 
\\~ e submit that in the particulars stated the giving 
of this instruction constituted prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court who gave these instructions deter-
mined that he was in error in requiring the added element 
of actual or constructive knowledge, particularly in the 
instruction given at defendant's request relating to the 
principle or doctrine of safe place to work. 
\V e sub1nit that the trial court was correct in its 
anal~·sis of this instruction and correct in its conclusion 
that the instruction was erroneously given. 
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\Ve respectfully submit that the ord8r· of the trial 
court granting to plaintiff a new trial in this case should 
be affirmed and the cas(~ returned to the District Court 
for the purpose of permitting plaintiff to try his case 
before a .Jury properly and correctly instructed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
Counsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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RECEIVED ................ copies of the within Brief of 
Respondent this ................ day of February, A. D. 1954. 
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